Abstract-We address the problem of detecting a stealth aircraft flying far away from an observer with limited visibility conditions using their multispectral signature. In such environment, the aircraft is a very low-contrast target, i.e., the target spectral signature may have a similar magnitude to the background clutter. Therefore, methods accounting only for the spectral features of the target, while leaving aside its spatial pattern, may either lead to poor detection statistics or high false alarm rate. We propose a new detection method which accounts for both spectral and spatial dispersions, by inferring level sets of the Mahalanobis transform of the multispectral image. This combines the approach of the well-known Reed Xiaoli (RX) detector with some elements of the level set methods for shapes analysis. This algorithm is in turn used to specify the wavelength bands which maximize an aircraft detection probability, for a given false alarm rate. This methodology is illustrated in a typical scenario, consisting of a daylight air-to-ground full-frontal attack by a generic combat aircraft flying at low altitude, over a database of 30 000 simulated multispectral infrared signature (IRS). The results emphasize that, in the context of aircraft detection, there is great interest in using multispectral IRS rather than integrated IRS, as long as the IR bands are well chosen.
I. INTRODUCTION

P
ROGRESS made during the last 50 years in optics sensors enhanced the use of infrared (IR) detection for scientific, surveillance, and military applications. IR sensors enable to detect targets that cannot be set apart from their surroundings in the visible spectral range, thanks to their emitted heat. In the last decade, the usefulness of multispectral or hyperspectral sensors for remote sensing assignments has been proven [1] , [2] and some studies [3] , [4] emphasize their potential for target detection. Multispectral sensors sample the incoming light from the scene in several, about 10 or less, wavelength bands, whereas hyperspectral sensors collect data in hundreds of narrow contiguous spectral bands. These sensors provide a powerful means to discriminate different materials on the basis of their unique spectral signatures. However, few multispectral sensors are, for now, available in the IR field. The underlying goal of this paper is to address the specification of a low-resolution multispectral IR sensor for stealth aircraft detection, from a signal processing perspective. Our objective is twofold:
1) designing an anomaly detection algorithm for multispectral images of low-resolution target; 2) specifying the IR wavelength bands which should be used in such applications. For many reasons, the experimental approaches do not allow to evaluate real multispectral IR signature (IRS) (aircrafts not available, safety reasons, etc.). More important, this would require to design a multispectral sensor with relevant IR wavelength bands for this application, which is precisely what we address in this paper. A significant research effort to model and predict aircraft IR radiation [5] - [7] has paved the way for computer programs allowing to simulate aircraft IRS, given a set of input parameters. In this context, ONERA has been continually developing over the last 30 years a simulation program for combat aircraft IRS, CRIRA [8] . However, CRIRA does not account for the output dispersion induced by uncertainty on input data (aircraft aspect angles, meteorological conditions, optical properties, etc.) and is, thus, coupled with uncertainty propagation methods [9] . As a consequence, for a given input data, the simulated IRS is no longer a single value, but a set of possible IRS which should include any experimentally measured IRS. IRS simulated through CRIRA has already been used to specify a general method to detect aircraft in low-resolution spectrally integrated IR images [10] .
In this paper, we consider multispectral aircraft IRS: each pixel is a vector whose coordinates correspond to the irradiance of the optronic scene partially integrated over a specified set of bands of the IR spectrum. In order to be useful, the sensor should be able to detect an aircraft far ahead. This explains the coarse resolution of the images we consider (16 × 16 pixels) , where the aircraft signs over at most 10 pixels. The sensor would indeed be too cumbersome otherwise. Even though hyperspectral images provide higher spectral resolution, the reason for focusing on multispectral data is twofold. First, given the typically low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of our application, any significant irradiance from a potential anomaly would be difficult to record in the hyperspectral narrow spectral bands. Second, since the IRS spectral components in hyperspectral images are quite correlated [11] , [12] , the discriminant signal conveyed by a potential anomaly would present more regularities and is likely to be drowned in the 1939-1404 © 2015 IEEE. Translations and content mining are permitted for academic research only. Personal use is also permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
intrinsic noise. Therefore, no significant gain in discrimination capability would be observed using hyperspectral images and we believe that considering larger wavelength bands is beneficial in our application. Target detection in multi/hyperspectral images has given rise to a wealth of research efforts [4] , [13] , [14] . The typical objective of these methods is to detect small and rare objects in a background clutter. Given a statistical model, most of the target detection algorithms derive from the Neyman-Pearson likelihood ratio test (LRT) or from the generalized LRT (GLRT), when some parameters are unknown. A highly sought after feature for these detectors is the constant false alarm rate (CFAR) property, implying that the probability of false alarm (PFA) does not depend on any unknown parameter. Therefore, it is theoretically possible to set the test rule so that the detector achieves a given false alarm rate.
In some applications, a characteristic spectral signature of the target is a priori known [4] , [15] - [17] . The corresponding detection methods are referred to as matched filter algorithms in the literature. Although being CFAR [15] , the detection performances of these algorithms rely upon the quality of the target reference spectrum, which may be difficult to obtain in practice. Moreover, it is not suitable to target whose spectral signature cannot be described by a model, which is the case in the situation we are interested in.
Another approach, referred to as anomaly detection, does not require any knowledge about the target spectral signature [13] . In this framework, it is assumed that most of the image is composed of a background clutter, whose first-and second-order statistics may be unknown. Anomaly detection algorithms aim at identifying areas or pixels of the image which significantly differ from the background. More precisely, in the multi/hyperspectral imagery context, this generally boils down to find pixels whose spectral properties stand out from those of the background. Reed and Yu [18] proposed a CFAR anomaly detector, referred to as the Reed Xiaoli (RX) detector and considered as the benchmark among the anomaly detection algorithms designed for multi/hyperspectral images. In the RX detector, the background pixels are supposed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with an unknown multivariate Gaussian distribution. Under this assumption, the GLRT amounts to compare the squared Mahalanobis distance between the sampled background distribution and a pixel under test to a detection threshold. A significant research effort based on the RX detector has thus emerged, mostly focusing on the estimation of background distribution moments. As a matter of fact, the homogeneous multivariate Gaussian distribution assumption is generally not suitable for real backgrounds as a whole, and deviations from this model lead to high false alarm rates. Among the different estimation methods proposed, reviewed in [13] and [19] , we can mention:
1) local RX [20] , [21] , in which the covariance matrix and the mean are estimated locally in a window around each pixel under test; 2) subspace RX [22] , in which the background statistics are determined after carrying out a principal components analysis and removing the first (high variance) principal components;
3) kernel RX [23] , in which a nonlinear transformation is performed on the input data, in order to better account for high-order correlations between spectral bands; 4) cluster-based or class-conditional RX, in which a clustering is first performed on the image. This clustering may be achieved with a mixture of Gaussian distributions model [24] , [25] . The background statistics are then estimated within each class, and the Mahalanobis distances between the pixel under test and each of the classes are determined. The final result is the minimum of these distances. Although in their seminal paper [18] , Reed and Yu assume the knowledge of the target optical pattern, most of the evolved RX detectors process each pixel separately, and do not account for the target spatial pattern [13] . However, a promising way of accounting for spatial contextual information was proposed in [26] . To achieve hyperspectral classification, this method uses a support vector machine algorithm with composite kernels for the clustering step, in order to add information about surrounding area of each pixel: a sum of two kernels is considered, one for the pixel signature, and the other one for the mean and/or the standard deviation of signatures of the surrounding pixels. Unfortunately, this is not suited to lowresolution objects: in the case of aircraft multispectral IRS, nearly all aircraft pixels are adjacent to several background pixels.
Therefore, to the best of our knowledge, detector in multi/hyperspectral images for low-resolution targets, whose spectral signature is unknown and taking into account the target sprawl, is yet to be proposed. This is particularly a relevant issue in the context of aircraft detection, as progress in the area of stealth technologies has allowed to reduce aircraft IRS. As a consequence, a stealth aircraft IR irradiance may hardly be higher than that of the background or from any decoy. This, combined with the low spatial resolution of multispectral images, explains the high false alarm rate that we observed in detection algorithms ala RX, which only exploit the spectral features conveyed by the IRS. Fig. 1 gives a hint of the kind of images that we are going to cope with and illustrates the two types of dispersion that should be handled by the proposed method.
1) Spatial dispersion: The geometry of the aircraft is different in the three images. 2) Spectral dispersion: The irradiance varies in intensity and in the different wavelength bands. On one hand, the multispectral IRS (a) and (c) has a similar spectral profile, whereas IRS (b) feature two distinct intensity peaks. On the other hand, the irradiance intensity in (a) and (b) is similar while it is clearly lower in (c). Some recent work by Liu et al. [11] has proposed multispectral bands selection for stealth aircraft detection by analyzing contrast characteristics between the two main constituents of aircraft's plume gas, i.e., H 2 O and CO 2 , and background. In this paper, we consider the whole aircraft IRS and we propose an innovative method for aircraft detection in a multispectral image: it takes simultaneously advantage of spectral and spatial discriminant features to reveal anomalies. It combines the Mahalanobis transform embedded in the RX algorithm with some level set techniques proposed in [10] . In most cases, aircraft correspond to hot temperatures at the sensor level. Hence, it is natural to rely on a detection test that considers the hottest pixels, i.e., pixels associated to highest IRS, in the sensed image, and, therefore, in its Mahalanobis transform. If these pixels are close, they are likely to come from a target; otherwise, they are considered as part of the clutter. Instead of manually testing the neighborhood of each hot pixel, we propose to take advantage of a powerful tool in image analysis: the level sets [27] - [29] . We believe that the proposed method is rather general and could be applied to other setups such as ground-level surveillance where targets would be observed from the nadir view-angle.
The results emphasize that, in the context of aircraft detection, 1) this new test significantly improves detection results compared to other RX-based methods that could be considered, especially when a low false alarm rate is required and 2) there is a great interest in using multispectral IRS rather than integrated IRS, as long as the IR bands are well chosen. As a matter of fact, the detection performances turn out to vary greatly according to the number and the location of spectral bands in the IR spectrum. We used a genetic algorithm (GA) [30] to optimize the detection performances and to provide the set of 2, 3, or 4 optimal elementary band combinations, which should be privileged in any aircraft detection application. This paper is organized as follows. The basic features of our IRS simulation are briefly outlined in Section II, the multispectral detection algorithm is introduced in Section III, and the wavelength bands selection strategy is detailed in Section IV. Finally, simulation results are reported in Section V.
II. IRS SIMULATION
The main principle of multispectral IR detection of aircraft is to compare the irradiance measured by the sensor due to the aircraft with that coming from the atmospheric background clutter, spectrally integrated in about 10 contiguous bands. The knowledge of both types of irradiance is, therefore, mandatory to design a detection method. In this paper, we do not make use of real IR data, but of simulated IRS. However, our simulator CRIRA has been compared with some experimental data, like the ones provided by a campaign which took place at Paris Orly airport in 2007. This validation study showed good agreement for a front or a rear view between experimental and simulated IRS; see [31] and [32] for more details. Yet, this point is crucial: indeed, any attempt to evaluate a detection test on synthesis images should be motivated by the fact that the associated IRS dispersion is realistic. We describe, in this section, the method used to simulate multispectral images, virtually recorded by the sensor.
The contributions to the aircraft IRS can be classified in heat source emission and airframe reflected light from the surrounding background. The emission comes mainly from: 1) the wings and the airframe, which are aerodynamically heated; 2) the air intakes, each composed of a cavity with an internal source represented by the first stages of low pressure compressor; 3) the engine plume hot gases; 4) the nozzle and the metallic components heated by the combustion gases; 5) some mechanical or electrical components, which are heat sources. The second class is composed of light coming from the atmosphere, the Earth's ground and the sun, which is reflected by the aircraft.
We consider a daylight air-to-ground attack in a mid latitude region by three different combat aircraft, flying at low altitude (800-1200 ft) without afterburning. The multispectral IR sensor is located on the ground, at a distance of 20 km from the target, in the flight direction. The aircraft is supposed to be spatially resolved, in each wavelength band, on a 16 × 16 pixels image by the sensor. This scenario is a typical one for a surveillance sensor, which aims at detecting menacing aircraft soon enough to organize defense reaction for a strategic area.
Among the input parameters expected by our computer simulation program CRIRA, 28 (listed in Table I ) are left unspecified in our scenario: 9 describe IR optical properties of the various aircraft surfaces, 7 are related to flight conditions, and 12 report to atmospheric conditions. Atmospheric conditions determine the atmospheric absorption and attenuation and lead to significant IRS variations in different battlefields. The generation of a large database of simulated multispectral IRS for the three aircraft is made with a Quasi-Monte Carlo sampling of the 28 uncertain input data. The Quasi-Monte Carlo method makes use of a slightly different kind of sampling than the Monte Carlo one, as described in [33] : the pseudorandom numbers are replaced with uniformly distributed determinist sequences, the low discrepancy sequences. As a matter of fact, the discrepancy D N * is a measure of the uniformity of the points dispersion. A low discrepancy sequence is characterized by a O (log(N ) p /N ) discrepancy, where p is the problem's dimension, that is to say the number of uncertain factors in this paper. In this study, we use a Faure-Tezuka sequence [34] , but any other low discrepancy sequences with good space filling properties in low order projections could be used. A single run of our simulation requires about 3 min (for each simulation performed in parallel on a 64 bits Sun Fire workstation, with 4 quad-core processors Intel Xeon), we thus keep the number of simulation runs below 10 000 for each aircraft.
As output, CRIRA provides 16 × 16 pixel multispectral images of the contrast between the irradiance due to the aircraft and that due to the background, in K 0 = 10 bands. We must, therefore, add a relevant background clutter model. We make a Gaussian white noise assumption for the background: when an aircraft is observed on a clear sky background, this assumption is completely realistic. For each multispectral image, the background spectral pixels are independent realizations of a multivariate Gaussian distribution with zero mean and diagonal covariance matrix whose coefficients {s k } K0 k=1 are detailed in (1) . To account for spatial dependence of the background, a textured Gaussian process would have been more appropriate to model a cloudy sky, but we preferred to focus on a simple background for this first application of our method.
By default, the multispectral IRS simulator provides K 0 = 10 elementary bands each having a spectral width of 100 cm −1 , in the 2000-3000 cm −1 range, that will be denoted band II in the following. A typical standard deviation s II = .058 has been estimated on measured sky images, spectrally integrated over the band II, and scaled in order to be consistent with images levels. Let the band II be decomposed in K 0 contiguous subbands of the type
. Under the assumptions that 1) the background clutter is a photon noise and 2) the incident photons follow a Poisson distribution, the standard deviation s k of the background clutter corresponding to the subband
may be expressed as a function of s II as follows:
where¯ k andσ k , respectively, denote the background spectral luminance and the mean wavelength of the subband
The mean values of the background spectral luminance {¯ k } K0 k=1 were estimated using MATISSE, a background scene generator developed at ONERA for the computation of natural background spectral radiance images [35] .
A remote sensor, monitoring the sky to protect a sensitive area or installation, acquires most of the time background images. Modeling a clear sky background by a field of independent identically distributed multivariate Gaussian variables, with zero mean and a diagonal covariance matrix Σ = (σ 2 1 , . . . , σ 2 K0 ), it is reasonable to assume that the continuous flow of background images allows a proper estimation of Σ. In the following, we assume that the background distribution, denoted B, is known.
III. A LEVEL SET APPROACH TO ANOMALY DETECTION
A. Statistical Framework
A multispectral image with K 0 spectral bands is a function f : Ω → R K0 , where Ω is a discrete and finite subset of R 2 . The set of multispectral images featuring K 0 bands is denoted F K0 , and let for all f ∈ F K0 , Ω B (f ) and Ω T (f ) denote the subspaces of Ω related to f background and target support, respectively. We assume that Ω T (f ) and
In addition, let |Ω| denotes the number of pixels in the image f . Finally, for all x ∈ Ω, the vector
denotes the pixel x irradiance integrated over the kth spectral band.
On the basis of this observation, a decision between two hypotheses, the null hypothesis H 0 corresponding to sky background and the alternative hypothesis H 1 , standing for everything but H 0 , shall be made. We, thus, assume that the set F K0 can be written as F K0 = H 0 ∪ H 1 . In our framework, an anomaly detection is a statistical test φ, mapping any multispectral image f ∈ F K0 to {0, 1} such that
In the following, Φ will denote the set of all possible mappings from F K0 to {0, 1}, for any K 0 ∈ N * . Positive samples are images which actually contain a target, and negative samples are background images and do not contain any target.
The performance of a detection test φ ∈ Φ is characterized by the two following statistics: 1) the probability to detect true positive samples P D (φ), defined for any f ∈ F K0 as
2) the probability to predict positive samples that are actually negative P FA (φ), also referred to as false alarm rate, and defined as
When these probabilities are analytically intractable, one may use the following estimates:
where |H 1 | and |H 0 | denote the number of positive and negative samples in the data set, respectively.
In addition to φ, anomaly detection methods such as the RX algorithm [18] use a pixel-level test which we will denote ψ in the following. Similarly to φ, ψ is a mapping from F K0 × Ω to {0, 1}, such that
Defining φ and ψ are two important issues when implementing a detection algorithm. In particular, there is always a compromise between increasing the probability of detection P D while keeping the, PFA, P FA low. For any given detector φ ∈ Φ, this tradeoff between these two statistics may be described by the receiver operating characteristic curve [ROC(φ)], which plots P D (φ) versus P FA (φ).
In this paper, we characterize a detection test performances with the following two statistics, which take into account a tradeoff between P D (φ) and P FA (φ).
1) A global indicator S 1 (φ) defined as the area under the curve ROC(φ). This is a standard way to measure the performance of a binary classifier φ. 2) A set of local indicators {S 2 (φ, ), ∈ (0, 1)} defined as the probability of detection given a fixed alarm rate , i.e., S 2 (φ, ) = max P D (φ) such that P FA (φ) ≤ , where
B. RX Anomaly Detection Test Applied to Our Framework
If we model the background as a K 0 -dimensional multivariate Gaussian distribution B = N (μ, Γ), a proper anomaly detector is the well-known RX detector [18] . In this case, the log-likelihood function of the background distribution is proportional to the Mahalanobis distance d M ( · , B) . For any f ∈ F K0 and x ∈ Ω, d M ( · , B) provides a similarity measure between f (x) and the background distribution B such that
For any multispectral image f ∈ F K0 , letf denote, in the following, the Mahalanobis transform of f defined for all
Although the spatial structure of f is preserved by the Mahalanobis transform,f does not inherit any quantitative spectral information from f but provides a cartography where high gray levels are likely to be anomalies. Fig. 2 illustrates the Mahalanobis transform of a synthetic multispectral image f , with K 0 = 4 spectral bands.
As explained in Section II, we assume that the background distribution is known and we first consider the base RX version φ RX . Under this assumption, for any multispectral image f ∈ F K0 , the Mahalanobis transform of a pixel x ∈ Ω B (f ) is the random variablef (x) ∼ χ 2 K0 , where χ 2 K0 is the chi-squared distribution with K 0 degrees of freedom. The PFA, in this case, is given by
by independence. The threshold α can, thus, be set to achieve a specific (constant) false alarm rate (CFAR property). Let φ (1) α ∈ Φ, with α ∈ (0, 1), be an anomaly detection test derived from the RX detector, defined by
where q α is the test threshold. A convenient property of this test is that the threshold q α can be set analytically in order to achieve a given false alarm rate: P FA (φ
Indeed, a basic proposition on the distribution of an i.i.d. random field yields
where
is the cumulative distribution function of the χ 2 K0 distribution. As a consequence, q α may be set as the (1 − α) 1/|Ω| -quantile of the χ 2 K0 distribution. However, as a by-product, for low false alarm rates q α can become very large, especially when |Ω| is high, yielding poor detection probabilities. A more general test φ (2) α,β derived from φ (1) α consists in detecting an anomaly in a multispectral image f ∈ F K0 when at least one pixel is unlikely to be a realization of a K 0 -degree of freedom chi-squared distribution. That is, either one pixel exceeds (or is lower) to a high (or a low) quantile of a χ 2 K0 random field. φ (2) α,β can be regarded as the two-tailed counterpart of φ (1) α . This test features the advantage of detecting anomalies with either a positive or a negative contrast from the background IRS. φ (2) α,β may be expressed as
where q α and q β are the two test thresholds. q α is defined as previously, while using the same argument as for q α , q β is set as a 1 − (1 − β) 1/|Ω| quantile of the χ 2 K0 distribution.
C. A Detection Test Combining Spectral and Spatial Information
Although, in our context, an aircraft is weakly resolved, its typical IRS spreads over a small set of adjacent pixels (Fig. 1) . As a consequence, the associated Mahalanobis transform also features meaningful adjacent pixels, an information which is left unused by φ (1) α and φ (2) α,β . An alternative to φ (1) α is thus to study some well chosen level sets off . Level sets have long proved their usefulness in image processing [27] - [29] . Here, they provide a handy tool for testing spatial proximity of pixels that are unlikely realizations of B. Indeed, the assumption that the background pixels are not spatially correlated implies that the observation of a large level set at a high quantile of the χ 2 K0 distribution is an unlikely event under H 0 and should help to identify a target. Hence, the level set analysis offers more protection against false positive samples than the standard RX test φ (1) α . This allows to decrease the test threshold q α which in turn will mathematically increase the true positive detection probability, while maintaining a reasonable false alarm rate.
Let us recall some basic definitions used in level set analysis (refer, for instance, to [36] for further details). In the sequel, let Ω be the R 2 extension of Ω and for any function g : Ω → R, let I(g) :Ω → R denote the bicubic interpolation of g onΩ (many other interpolation schemes could also be used as well). Moreover, let for any (α, β) ∈ R 2 , C + α (g) and C − β (g) be the two level sets defined by
The interpolation implies that I(g) is continuous onΩ and that regularity conditions hold. In particular, the α-level line L
We propose a third detection test φ (3) α,ν ∈ Φ, making use of these level set tools. For convenience, we begin to define the corresponding set of anomalous pixels of any f ∈ F K0
where for any level line l or level set c, Per(l) and Per(c) both denote its perimeter. The pixel-level and image-level detection tests may, thus, be expressed as follows: 
α,ν exploits both spatial and spectral information in that it only retains sets of adjacent pixels of the Mahalanobis transform above the noise level. Moreover, compared to φ (1) α or φ (2) α,β , it conveys a spatial information about the target location. Fig. 3 illustrates the appropriateness of taking into account some well chosen level lines in the detection test φ (3) α,ν on some 64 × 64 multispectral images, which was used for illustration purpose. The top panel (a) displays the level line set L
α (f ) contains the target, it also features level lines that belong to the background and which could potentially yield to false alarms. Conversely, the bottom panel (b) displays only the elements of L (+) α (f ) whose perimeter exceeds a threshold ν: this set is actually restricted to the target. To focus on the relevant level sets, α and ν should be set such that an α-level set with perimeter larger than ν is an event with low probability for a χ 2 K0 random field. Therefore, α may be taken as a (1 − 10 −p )-quantile of the χ 2 K0 distribution, where p ≥ 1. However, the distribution of the maximum perimeter of a α-level set of a χ 2 K0 field, denoted P α , is intractable. Thus, there is no analytical value for the threshold ν, such that φ (3) α,ν achieves a prescribed false alarm rate. Nevertheless, for a rough false alarm rate P FA (φ
−r , where r > 0, the calibration of the test may be achieved thanks to simulations: ν may be set as a Monte Carlo approximation of the (1 − 10 −r )-quantile of P α , since one can sample from P α .
Complementarily to φ (3) α,ν and similarly to φ (2) α,β , we define a last detection test φ (4) α,β,ν ∈ Φ defined for any f ∈ F K0 as
The possible anomalies are likely to belong either to a α-upper level set or to a β-lower level set of a |Ω|-dimensional χ 2 K0 random field. α and β may be set as high and low quantiles of the χ 2 K0 distribution, respectively. ν can be defined in the same way as for φ (3) α,ν case. As mentioned in Section I, when the background distribution B is unknown, one can substitute the mean μ and the covariance matrix Σ with their maximum likelihood estimateμ and Σ. Moreover, it was demonstrated in [18] that the CFAR property remains valid: instead of a χ 2 K0 distribution, the false alarm rate follows a beta distribution, whose parameters only depend upon K 0 and |Ω|. Thus, the four detection tests we have proposed may also be used when the background distribution B is unknown. The only requirement is to have sufficient number of background samples f ∈ H 0 , to have a good estimate of the test thresholds via Monte Carlo sampling, which is always the case for monitoring applications.
Moreover, the scope of application of this method could be extended to address target detection in multispectral satellite images or airphotos. In such setups, the potential target operates on the ground and the scene is monitored from the nadir viewangle. Possible nonhomogeneous backgrounds (e.g., forest, sea, and desert) could be handled by defining B as a mixture model.
IV. WAVELENGTH BANDS SELECTION
Our database of simulated aircraft IRS consists of multispectral images featuring K 0 = 10 elementary spectral bands {b k } 10 k=1 evenly spaced across the 2000-3000 cm −1 spectral range (actually, 10 bands of spectral width 100 cm −1 ). However, as already mentioned in [17] , [37] , and [11] , the number of bands K and their location in the 2000-3000 cm −1 spectrum both have a huge impact in the detection performance, regardless the detector φ ∈ Φ choice. Fig. 4 displays the distribution of the Mahalanobis transform of pixels in a multispectral image f ∈ F K with K = 1, 2, 4, and 6 bands. On the one hand, the plain lines correspond to the analytic distribution of the background pixels, i.e., the chi-squared distribution with 1, 2, 4, and 6 degrees of freedom. On the other hand, the dashed line refers to the empirical distribution of the target pixels denoted T which does not vary significantly with K. The hatched areas below the plain lines correspond to the respective false alarm rate achieved with the different values of K. This shows that, in the case of our distribution T , the higher the number of bands K involved in the multispectral image, the higher is the expected false alarm rate. Second, a higher number of spectral bands enables the identification of different spectral features and thus leads to an easier discrimination between background and target pixels. However, compared with broader bands measurements, narrow spectral bands may significantly reduce the SNR. As a consequence, considering groups of consecutive elementary bands are a promising prospect.
Third, the location of some elementary bands is such that they do not provide any information about the targets. As a matter of fact, the atmospheric absorption phenomenon, due in particular to H 2 O and CO 2 in the 2000-3000 cm −1 range, makes some elementary bands irrelevant.
For all these reasons, a tradeoff on the band number K and their respective bandwidth should be made, and a band selection step is, therefore, mandatory. We consider multispectral images with K bands as follows.
1) Each band {r
is a group of some consecutive elementary bands. 2) A spectral band r k may not consist in more than C consecutive elementary bands. 3) Two spectral bands r k and r k+1 are separated by at least one elementary band. The first constraint aims at aggregating similar contiguous bands, the second forces to account for multiple bands and the last one can be regarded as a way to decouple the correlated information. These constraints induce a set E K of the possible combinations providing multispectral images with K bands. For all γ ∈ E K , define T γ as the mapping F 10 → F K , such that for all f ∈ F 10 , T γ (f ) is the multispectral image f corresponding to the group γ (cf., Fig. 5 ). More precisely, we have
T γ (f ) is an additive transformation since 1) the target pixels in each band are already integrated data (and therefore additive) and 2) the background pixels of different bands must be added up in order to satisfy the variance model (1) .
For a given detector φ ∈ Φ, we propose, in this section, a method to find the element γ * ∈ E K such that for all γ ∈ E K then either (i) or (ii) holds:
where S 1 γ (φ) and S 2 γ (φ), respectively, refer to the detection statistics S 1 (φ) and S 2 (φ) defined in Section III, but applied to the multispectral images T γ (f ) instead of f .
Any combination γ ∈ E K may be parameterized by some vector θ ∈ Θ K , where Θ K is the subset of N 2K defined as follows:
For all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, θ 2k denotes the number of consecutive elementary band(s) in the group r k . Conversely, θ 2k−1 denotes the number of elementary band(s) left out between r k−1 and r k . Thus, for each θ ∈ Θ K , it exists an unique γ ∈ E K and conversely and with some abuse of notations we write T θ (f ) for the multispectral image f corresponding to the bands grouping θ. As a consequence, finding the combination γ * ∈ E K which satisfies the relations (i) or (ii) defined above is equivalent to finding the corresponding optimal parameter θ * ∈ Θ K . Fig. 6 provides an example of such a parameterization.
Finding the optimal parameter θ * ∈ Θ K is a discrete optimization problem with constraints. For this reason, we chose, in this work, to use a GA [30] to perform this task. By analogy with the evolutionary theory which predicts that, in a random population, only the individuals the most adapted to the environment will survive, a GA looks for the gene that corresponds to the fittest individual. In our context, for a given number of band groups K, the population consists in the possible band combinations θ ∈ Θ K , the genes are the parameters θ 1 , . . . , θ 2K and the fitness function (fitting environment measure) μ is either the function θ → S 1 θ (φ) or θ → S 2 θ (φ), where, with some abuse of notations, S θ i (φ) denotes the statistic S i (φ) evaluated on the images T θ (f ).
By deriving successive generations from an initial random population, the GA will provide in fine individuals belonging to the last generation, which are the fittest with respect to the environment. Algorithm 1 summarizes the different steps performed at each iteration of the GA. Implementation issues are discussed in Section V.
With a proper population size N and a generation number M specified, this constrained and discrete optimization problem may be achieved through the routine ga available in the Matlab Global Optimization Toolbox. 
Algorithm 1. Genetic algorithm.
Require: A detector φ ∈ Φ, a fitness function μ, the number of band groups K, the population size N and the number of generations M . 1: Initialization: start with a random population {θ
Evaluation: measure the fitness of the population by computing μ(θ (i) ) and keeps the N fittest individual, 3: Selection: draw N couples such that each individual has a probability corresponding to its fitness, 4: Reproduction: each couple provides an individual such that: 1) each gene shared by the parents is preserved, 2) other genes are drawn randomly up to the limit that the new individual remains in Θ K , 3) random mutations also happen with low probability. The resulting 2N population is then evaluated with step (2).
V. RESULTS OF THE METHODOLOGY'S APPLICATION
A. Detectors Comparison
In this section, we compare the different detectors defined in Section III applied to the raw multispectral images f ∈ F 10 . Fig. 7 . ROC curves of φ (1) , φ (2) , φ (3) , and φ (4) applied to f ∈ F (2) 10 . Fig. 8 . Statistics of the four detectors applied to f ∈ F (2) 10 .
The multispectral image database for the three combat aircraft will be denoted as F will stand for the complete database gathering the three aircraft.
A first graphical evidence about the relevance of simultaneously taking into account high and low level sets of the Mahalanobis transformf in the detection test is given in Fig. 7 . It displays the four detectors φ (1) , φ (2) , φ (3) , and φ (4) ROC curves in log scale, obtained by applying these detectors using different parameters α, β, and ν to N = 10 000 multispectral images such that {f n } 5000 n=1 ∈ F
10 and |H 0 | = 5000 background images. For notational simplicity, we omit the parameters in the detection test denomination. Clearly, the ROC curve associated to φ (1) is below that of φ (2) and the one associated to φ (3) is below that of φ (4) , implying that the latter two detectors outperform the two former. Quantitatively, Fig. 8 provides the statistics S 1 and S 2 characterizing the four Fig. 9 . ROC curves of the detectors φ (2) and φ (4) 
detectors. First, this confirms the conjecture made with Fig. 7 . Then, this shows that when low false alarm rate is required, the information conveyed by the level lines improves significantly the detection: for P FA < 10 −3 , P D (φ (1) ), and P D (φ (2) ) shrink dramatically.
In the following, we compare the two best detectors, namely the RX-based detector φ (2) and the level set based φ (4) for each aircraft. Fig. 9 plots the ROC curves in log scale for the four different databases. In Fig. 9(a)-(c) , the training set consisted of N = 5000 multispectral images f of F (1) 10 , F (2) 10 , and F (3) 10 , respectively, along with |H 0 | = 5000 background images, while in Fig. 9 were used along with |H 0 | = 5000 background images.
Most of the type 1 aircraft feature a single hot pixel: as a consequence, it is no surprise that the two ROC curves in Fig. 9(a) are closer than in any other scenario. Indeed, the detector φ (4) ROC curve is achieved for level sets that encompass one or at most two pixels, which is equivalent to the min/max test φ (2) . The cases of aircraft 2 and 3 are interesting because the detection performance of φ (2) and φ (4) does not evolve similarly: φ (2) detects more easily type 2 aircraft than type 3 and conversely for φ (4) . This actually meets the aircraft 2 and 3 characteristics: while most of the time, the aircraft 2 has an higher IRS than aircraft 3, the min/max test φ (2) detects better aircraft 2 than aircraft 3. On the other hand, because aircraft 3 IRS is characterized by a relatively low but constant level it is, thus, easier to detect for the level set test φ (4) than aircraft 2. In all the cases, the level set test outperforms the min/max RX detector.
In addition of being more efficient than φ (2) , the detector φ (4) provides spatial information about the aircraft location in the multispectral images.
The set of the estimated target pixels is defined as the inner pixels of the contour line l ∈ L
having the larger perimeter. If this perimeter is lower than the threshold ν, no target is detected and thus the estimated target pixels are the empty set. Fig. 10 illustrates the spatial information conveyed by φ (4) : Fig. 10(a) represents a (difficult) multispectral image f of a type 2 aircraft, Fig. 10(b) shows the corresponding Mahalanobis Fig. 10(c) displays the set of the estimated target pixels (the white pixels) and the true target pixels (inner pixels of the green line). To make the location test more challenging, a background was added to the original 16 × 16 images [a Gaussian white noise with variance given in (1)] so that in Fig. 10 , the detection algorithm is applied to a 48 × 48 sample.
B. Optimal Band Selection
The raw database provides standard multispectral images f ∈ F 10 . We consider, in the following, multispectral images derived from this database, featuring K = 2, 3, or 4 groups {r k } K k=1 of consecutive elementary subbands and for which the constraints imposed in Section IV hold. In this implementation, we added a group length restriction. 1) For all K ∈ {2, 3, 4} and for all 1 ≤ k ≤ K, t 2k ≤ 4. Moreover, we used the following specification for the GA 1. 1) Given two parents, say θ (1) and θ (2) , the cross-over operator ] sets the genes of a children, say θ = (θ 1 , . . . , θ 2K ), such that only the genes unshared by the parents, i.e., the genes in the set G 1,2 := {1 ≤ ≤ 2K, θ (1) = θ (2) } are globally refreshed. This is achieved by choosing θ with a discrete uniform random draw on the following set: 2) The mutation step [Step 4-(c)] allows the gene of any individual to randomly change at each iteration with a probability of 1%. If a mutation occurs locally on the gene θ k of some individual θ ∈ Θ K , θ k is replaced with a discrete uniform random draw on the set Fig. 11 shows some ROC curves obtained by applying the detector φ (4) to a database featuring N = 5000 multispectral images {f n ∈ F
3 } 5000 n=1 and |H 0 | = 5000 background images. The four curves correspond to different band combinations θ ∈ Θ 3 : the plain curve is achieved with the parameter θ * ∈ Θ 3 which maximizes the criterion θ → S θ 1 (φ (4) ). The dashed curves are related to other parameters
specified in Fig. 11(b) . Given similar band combination, the resulting area under ROC curve (AUC) turns out to be significantly different: it is, therefore, crucial for the detection performance to know the optimal band combination. This band selection method could also help to discriminate decoys from real aircraft, provided that their emission spectrum does not perfectly match the radiation of the airplane. If not, following the method developed in [38] , an additional classification step making use of geometric features of the targets will be necessary. Using the detector φ (4) and multispectral images of aircraft 1, Fig. 12 shows the GA outcomes for K = 2 band combinations and using different parameters. The blue curves are obtained for the fitness function μ = S 1 (φ (4) ) and the black ones for μ = S 2 (φ (4) , = 5 × 10 −2 ). The plain and dashed lines only differ according to the GA parameters: the population size and the generation number, referred to as N and M in Algorithm 1, respectively. For each scenario, the quantitative results of Fig. 12(b) confirm that the GA provides band combinations which are coherent with the fitness function μ and that the optimization improves with M and N . Still, the computation time considerably increases with these two parameters. Therefore, given that the detection performances vary very little, the parameters μ = S 1 , N = 10, and M = 50 will be used in the following. Fig. 13 displays the ROC curves of the detector φ (4) applied to the multispectral images f ∈ F (1) [ Fig. 13(a) ], f ∈ F (2) [ Fig. 13(b) ], f ∈ F (3) [ Fig. 13(c) ], and f ∈ F (all) [ Fig. 13(d) ]. The GA was applied to these four data sets with the parameters μ, N , and M specified above to obtain the optimal parameters θ * 2 , θ * 3 , and θ * 4 corresponding to the K = 2, K = 3, and K = 4 optimal band combinations, respectively. For each data type, the detector φ (4) is applied to the multispectral images featuring:
1) the optimal band combinations for K = 2 combinations θ * 2 (plain black curves); 2) the optimal band combinations for K = 3 combinations θ * 3 (dotted black curves); 3) the optimal band combinations for K = 4 combinations θ * 4 (dashed black curves); 4) the images integrated over the band II spectrum, i.e., monospectral θ * II (plain green curves); 5) the standard multispectral images, i.e., with K 0 = 10 elementary subbands, θ 
For all data sets, the K = 2 band combination outperforms the other band combinations with K = 3 and K = 4. However, there is no such general ranking between the optimal combinations of K = 3 and K = 4 bands. In comparison, the standard multispectral images with K 0 = 10 subbands are always less efficient than the optimal K = 2 band combination but may achieve better performance than the optimal K = 3 and K = 4 band combinations. For K = 3 and K = 4, the optimal band combinations θ * K ∈ Θ K are identical for the different aircraft. For K = 2, the optimal band combinations are the same for two aircraft and only differ with one element for the third one. This simulation shows that provided the knowledge of the optimal band combinations, there is a definite interest in using multispectral images to perform detection instead of monospectral images: indeed, the ROC curves obtained for the monospectral data set are always below the best multispectral ROC curve.
Regardless of the data set, the optimal parameter θ * always presents the same spectral profile: a first short group involving two elementary subbands early in the band II and a second group of three or four elementary subbands further in the band II. The optimal nature of the K = 2 band combinations may be explained with two arguments.
1) Algorithm justification: For any standard multispectral image f ∈ F 10 , consider the multispectral image T θ * (f ) ∈ F 2 , (θ * ∈ Θ 2 ). If a target is present in the multispectral image T θ * (f ), then it is likely to appear in inverted contrast in the first image and in positive contrast in the second one. Indeed, for the first group, the noise level is high (the noise level is higher at the beginning of the band II) and the aircraft signature is low (only two bands are taken into account in the first group of θ * ). Conversely, the several bands of the second group provide a stronger target signal while maintaining a low noise level. As a consequence, a target embedded in a multispectral image T θ * (f ) ∈ F 2 may, thus, be detected either with the level set L + α (f ) and/or L − β (f ).
2) Physical justification:
The engine plume hot gases emissions, mainly constituted of H 2 O and CO 2 , radiate at 2.7, 4.3, and 4.9 µm and may, thus, sign at the beginning of the band II. Hence, [11] selected the spectral band from 4.17 to 4.55 µm for their application. Moreover, the CO 2 absorption band in the neighborhood of 3.5 µm corresponds to the gap between the first and the second group. Finally, the information conveyed by the second band group coincides with the fuselage reflectance which signs at 4.3 µm. Note that the optimal band combinations with K = 3 or K = 4 tend to adopt the same spectral profile as θ * ∈ Θ 2 by artificially adding one or two irrelevant band group(s) in the end of the band II to reach their target number of groups K. As a consequence, in addition to providing an explanation of the optimality of θ * 2 , these two arguments provide a justification of the suboptimality of the band combinations θ * 3 and θ * 4 . In this paper, we focus on the single sensor case, but if multiple sensors are used our method still applies, only the optimal band combination could differ.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have introduced a novel method to perform anomaly detection in low-resolution multispectral images. The detection task is challenging because the targets feature simultaneously spectral and spatial dispersion and few prior knowledge are available. The proposed detector φ (4) , combining a Neyman-Pearson LRT and a study of relevant level sets, is designed to handle these dispersions and is shown to outperform the standard RX detector, in our case.
This detector was then used to identify the optimal spectral band combination for stealth aircraft detection, i.e., the band number and their location in the band II spectrum. It results that, for three different military aircraft, the same spectral profile featuring a combination of K = 2 bands, provides the best detection performance. The optimization method and at large the proposed detection methodology can be extended to other situations: other targets, different backgrounds, etc.
In particular, an interesting issue that remains to be addressed in the aircraft detection context is the anomaly detection in a cloudy sky background. In [10] , a fractional Brownian motion was used to model this kind of textured background for monospectral images. Provided a model extending this pattern to the multispectral approach, it would be interesting to study how does the detector φ (4) cope with such a background.
